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Introduction 
 
 
Dress Rehearsal for Russia’s 
Presidential Election 
Moscow Tightens Grip on Regional Governors and Budgets 
Fabian Burkhardt and Janis Kluge 
Fifteen Russian regions and annexed Sevastopol elected new governors on 10 September 
2017. The process reveals the Kremlin’s response to rising socio-economic tensions in 
Russia’s regions: changing their leaders. A string of older regional bosses rooted within 
their local elites have been forced to make way for a younger generation of political 
managers over whom Moscow holds greater sway. The regions’ financial independence 
has been curtailed again too. For the Kremlin, this round of voting represented the 
final test before the presidential election scheduled for 18 March 2018 – and it passed 
off largely successfully. But the next presidential term will also see growing uncertain-
ty over Vladimir Putin’s successor in the Kremlin. These latest centralisation moves are 
designed to counter potential political risks ahead of time. But they weaken the incen-
tives for governors to invest in the long-term development of their regions. 
 
The regional and local elections held on 
10 September 2017 in eighty of the eighty-
three federal subjects (plus annexed Crimea 
and Sevastopol) included sixteen guberna-
torial contests. The results confirm a trend 
already seen in the 2016 Duma elections: 
the already ascendant United Russia was 
able to expand its hold on power, while the 
Kremlin-loyal “systemic” opposition parties 
all lost ground. A Just Russia was worst af-
fected, but the far-right LDPR and the Com-
munist Party (CPRF) fared little better. Only 
in Moscow’s municipal elections was a coa-
lition of Yabloko, independents and a num-
ber of CPRF candidates led by former Duma 
deputy Dmitry Gudkov able to achieve a 
respectable showing with 262 of 1,502 seats 
(17.4 percent). In these 125 Moscow districts 
however, United Russia also increased its 
share to 77 percent of the seats. 
The Presidential Administration under 
First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko 
treated the sixteen direct gubernatorial 
races as the principal dress rehearsal for 
the 2018 presidential election. Overall, can-
didates supported by the Kremlin gained 
75 percent of the votes, although figures 
who might have represented a credible 
alternative were excluded from standing. 
However, as in the 2016 Duma elections, 
the average turnout of 40 percent was notice-
ably down on earlier ballots. The Kremlin 
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needs strong participation in the 2018 
presidential election to secure the regime’s 
legitimacy vis-à-vis the elites and the popu-
lation. Turnout for presidential elections 
is traditionally higher than for Duma and 
regional contests – almost 70 percent in 2008 
and 65 percent in 2012 – but also declining. 
And low turnout at the presidential election 
would be interpreted as a sign of weakness 
by potential counterelites. 
Centrally Controlled 
Regional Elections 
Governors play a special role in Russia’s 
three-tier administrative system. In the 
executive power vertical they represent 
the link between the federal organs and 
local administrations. Direct elections were 
abolished in 2004, with governors de facto 
appointed by the president until 2012. 
Presidents Putin and Medvedev concentrated 
on installing regional bosses who would 
ensure comfortable majorities for United 
Russia. Successful economic policy was less 
of a priority. In response to massive protests 
over electoral fraud following the 2011 
Duma elections, however, the Kremlin had 
direct elections reinstated. But the motiva-
tion was not to fulfil the demonstrators’ 
demands for liberalisation. Instead Moscow 
believed that its appointed governors had 
lost the ability to guarantee satisfactory 
election results without resorting to unduly 
obvious manipulation. 
In order to avoid undue surprises, several 
precautions were taken when gubernatorial 
elections were reintroduced in 2012. A “mu-
nicipal filter” requires candidates to obtain 
the backing of 5 to 10 percent of their 
region’s local councillors. Given that most 
of these are controlled by the serving gover-
nors, this arrangement creates a significant 
obstacle to opposition candidates. In the 
2017 gubernatorial elections the electoral 
commission turned down about one-third 
of applicants, with legal challenges getting 
nowhere. Those accepted included spoiler 
candidates supported by the regional govern-
ment. In the run-up to the elections, gover-
nors were made to resign before the end of 
their official term by order of the presiden-
tial administration, allowing President Putin 
to appoint interim successors who then 
entered the races with Moscow’s explicit 
backing. They also benefited from high-pro-
file meetings with and visits by President 
Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev. 
The upshot of these moves by the Krem-
lin has been to severely narrow political 
competition. All the country’s governors, 
with the exception of Smolensk, Oryol and 
Irkutsk, now either belong to United Russia 
or enjoy its support. Since 2012 only one 
governor has even had to enter a run-off; 
during a comparable period before elec-
tions were abolished in 2004, twenty-nine 
contests remained undecided in the first 
round. 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
Moscow’s personnel policy has shifted of 
late. After pursuing a principle of stability 
until 2016, the Kremlin switched in 2017 to 
rotation and new blood. The average age of 
the eleven newcomers in the September 2017 
elections was forty-four, ten years younger 
than the previous cohort of governors. 
Yet despite the dearth of political com-
petition, governors are finding themselves 
squeezed. The recession dragging on since 
2014 has heightened rivalry over scarce 
resources within regional elites, while 
strikes and social protests are growing. In 
the first half of 2017 more than 650 pro-
tests were reported nationwide, most of 
them outside Moscow and Saint Petersburg. 
At the same time Moscow is pressing its 
governors to reverse the long-term trend of 
falling turnout and shrinking majorities in 
federal and regional elections. The centre 
would also like to see governors desisting 
from overtly abusing their privileges of 
office and access to the financial and or-
ganisational levers of the state (“adminis-
trative resources”), and if possible refrain-
ing from open electoral fraud. This leaves 
little room for political objectives like the 
long-term development of the regions. 
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In the meantime the risks associated 
with the position have grown too: federal 
control is no longer channelled only 
through incentives like transfers, but since 
2015 increasingly exercised by repressive 
means. In three of the sixteen regions where 
elections were held in September, the serv-
ing governor had been arrested and forced 
to resign after investigations by the Federal 
Security Service FSB. Criminal investiga-
tions are currently ongoing against about 
2 percent of the regional elite. 
For these young technocrats, their quasi-
appointment represents something of a 
baptism of fire. If they can deliver the re-
quired results in the upcoming presidential 
election and survive the socio-economic 
challenges of coming years, the door to a 
career in the Presidential Administration or 
the government will be open. On the other 
hand, the new personal risks detract from 
the prestige of the office. 
Financial Centralisation 
Russia’s regions have lost a great deal of 
their financial independence over the course 
of recent years. One reason for this is their 
debt, which has doubled since 2012 after 
Putin issued a series of decrees drastically 
increasing public sector pay. The regions – 
already struggling with the impact of the 
economic crisis – had to find the required 
funds from within their budgets, without 
adequate recompense from the centre. Ini-
tially they borrowed at high interest rates 
from commercial banks, later the finance 
ministry granted low-interest loans. While 
this reduced the burden of interest, Mos-
cow tied subsidised loans to conditions that 
restrict the regions’ financial freedoms. 
Closer examination of the September 
2017 election suggests that Moscow has 
concentrated on changing the governors 
of highly indebted regions: in the fifteen 
regions where gubernatorial elections were 
held (excluding Sevastopol) the average 
debt is 73 percent of regional tax revenues, 
compared to a national average of 43 per-
cent. And according to observers, insuffi-
cient tax revenues played a role in the 
ouster of the former governor of Kirov 
Oblast, Nikita Belykh, who was charged by 
the FSB for corruption in 2016. In August 
2017 the finance ministry threatened the 
governor of North Ossetia–Alania with 
dismissal over the failure of his borrowing 
and budget policies. 
Yet despite a situation of widespread 
regional budget strictures, the distribution 
of tax revenues was readjusted to the detri-
ment of the regions this year. They now 
receive only a portion of the indirect tax 
revenues (excise taxes) on the sale of petrol 
and diesel (hitherto 100 percent). And at 
the beginning of 2017 the regions’ share of 
taxes on commercial profits, which repre-
sent about one-third of their tax revenues, 
was reduced from 90 to 85 percent. So the 
regions now receive a smaller share of the 
returns on their economic policies. 
Instead Moscow has increased its centrally 
controlled transfers. Seventy of the eighty-
three Russian federal subjects currently 
depend on an annual top-up. Annexed Cri-
mea and Sevastopol receive subsidies far 
exceeding the average, and just thirteen 
regions are net contributors (compared to 
twenty-five in 2006). These transfers partially 
compensate lost tax revenues, but also 
solidify central control. Funds from Moscow 
come with political strings attached: some-
times the regions must fulfil formal criteria 
laid down by the centre; other types of sub-
sidy and transfer function completely with-
out formal guidelines and are granted at will 
on purely political grounds. So regions with 
strong interest groups of their own are allo-
cated smaller amounts, while the Kremlin’s 
new favourites receive a financial bonus. 
Outlook 
The early-autumn test for next year’s presi-
dential election passed off to the regime’s 
satisfaction. In March 2018 the Kremlin will 
hope most of all to increase turnout in order 
to boost Putin’s legitimacy. Possible strat-
egies include simultaneous local referen-
dums or staging prize draws for voters. 
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However, Putin’s likely re-election on 
18 March 2018 – the fourth anniversary 
of the Crimea annexation – will also mark 
the start of the struggle over his succession. 
As the constitution currently stands, Putin 
is barred from running for re-election in 
2024. As soon as his term begins, compet-
ing factions in the security organs, politics 
and state-owned enterprises will be jostling 
to position their favoured candidates. 
Putin’s fourth term will be more preoccu-
pied than ever with avoiding domestic 
political risk, so regional politics will play 
a crucial role: regional budgets remain 
tight and protests are growing – mostly 
driven by social grievances and especially 
outside Moscow and Saint Petersburg. 
Opposition leader Aleksei Navalny’s ex-
tensive network of regional campaign 
teams took observers by surprise in 2017, 
as did his numerous protest actions in the 
regions. While the suspended prison term 
handed down in a political trial will almost 
certainly preclude a run for president, 
Navalny will surely remain an important 
disruptive element. 
The Kremlin is pressing ahead with its 
generational make-over in the federal and 
regional public administration. This was 
already apparent in 2016 when Anton 
Vaino was appointed Chief of Staff of the 
Presidential Administration and Maksim 
Oreshkin Minister for Economic Develop-
ment. Moscow’s new cadre policy is de-
signed to further tighten its grip over the 
regions. While centralisation of power in 
response to political risk has been a stock 
response of the Putin era, restricted finan-
cial leeway and new personal risks reduce 
incentives for governors to invest in the 
long-term development of their regions. 
While the Kremlin may be seeking to boost 
vote share and turnout in 2018 with a re-
form agenda, it is clear that political control 
will remain more important than the coun-
try’s economic prospects. In other words, 
the structural problems of the regions will 
not be resolved but instead shifted to Mos-
cow. And that further ups the stakes in the 
poker for Putin’s succession. 
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